file 15

In the language of civil defence the armed forces, police and fire services are often collectively called “the uniformed services” to distinguish them from the government officials and volunteers involved in civil defence work. As well as being organised, trained and equipped for a peacetime role which would readily transfer to a civil defence one these services would also provide bodies of disciplined people used to accepting responsibility and which the public would readily look to in a crisis. To a limited degree, but one much greater than the public in general these services would also be trained and psychologically prepared for the problems caused by war. The same could also be said of the Royal Observer Corps and in the 1950s and 1960s the Civil Defence Corps.

Following the Strath Report the armed forces were given the role of assisting the civil defence services in the survival period. In the 1950s the forces, and the army in particular, was much larger than today in part due to national service and in wartime it would call on the extensive reserve and territorial forces. Some major army units were directly allocated to the Home Defence Regions but of particular significance to civil defence was the Mobile Defence Corps. This was formed in 1955 specifically for civil defence. It was to consist of 48 battalions each with a minimum of 600 personnel, which would come under direct Army or RAF command. The personnel would be trained in rescue, fire fighting and first aid during their active service with the Army or RAF. They would then have a duty to train with and if necessary serve in one of the battalions as part of their reserve obligations. In practice, most of the men came from units of the recently disbanded Anti-Aircraft Command. The end of national service meant that there would no longer be enough reservists for the Corps and it was disbanded in 1959.

As national service came to an end and the armed forces were generally reduced in size in the 1960s there were fewer and fewer troops available generally for home or civil defence duties. Following the 1965 Home Defence Review an attempt was made to recruit 28000 volunteers to form the Home Defence Force (usually known as TAVR lll) who were specifically intended for law and order duties post-nuclear attack. As with other such organisations the units were rarely at full strength or properly equipped.[1] They were unpopular with the civil servants who oversaw the civil defence budgets who believed, that like the Civil Defence Corps, they would be of no real value but they were popular with what might be called “the retired colonels” lobby. However, after a considerable debate, which paralleled that which finally saw the end of the Corps the TAVR lll was scrapped in 1969.

At this time, the UK Commanders in Chief Committee (Home) was responsible for the military aspects of home defence. It consisted of the Commander-in-Chief Naval Home Command, the Air Commander Home Defence Forces and the Commander-in-Chief UK Land Forces who acted as Chairman. During a period of tension, this committee would oversee such matters as mobilisation and the protection of the UK home base. As the crisis escalated, they would disperse to their individual wartime headquarters keeping in contact via the CONRAD radio net. Their operational orders then told them that, after a nuclear attack, “if you survive”, they, together with their staffs should report to the Chief of the Defence Staff of the surviving “central government authority

The continued run down of the armed forces manpower meant there would be few troops available for home defence duties both before and after an attack. In 1970 the Chiefs of Staff had estimated that there would be some 30000 military personnel available post-strike against a potential requirement of 196000 and in 1974 it was publicly admitted[2] that the forces would have little manpower or equipment for purely civil defence work. The military planners in particular expected a massive need for armed troops to support the police in maintaining law and order but army manuals and College briefings showed that the role of the armed forces would extend beyond this to include

The Ministry of Defence War Book in the mid-1960s also assigned four battalions for “special Government War Book measures –

In the early 1960s, the RAF expected to form regional air squadrons each with 24 RAF training and transport aircraft for reconnaissance and communications in the region. It also planned to set up a Central Government Squadron with 16 aircraft for national communications. By the 1980s, it was still expected that regional squadrons would be formed but these would be on an ad hoc basis and would now use civilian aircraft.

From the 1970s some Territorial Army units were designated for “home defence” and some “composite companies” would have been formed from military personnel in administration, training and other units who did not have a designated war role. A 1984 briefing from the College suggests that there would be 110000 members of the armed forces in the UK at the time of an attack but this seems a very high figure. Other documents suggest that it was planned to have a contingency reserve in each region of “at least one battalion of 400 men” or that there would be up to two battalions assigned to each region, although these would also have to guard key points.

The Strath Report resulted in the need for military and civilian forces to work more closely together in the survival period and this was one of the key elements in the joint civil-military headquarters plan in the mid-1950s. The Home Defence regions and the army districts would have the same boundaries and the Regional Military Commander would be located with his wartime District HQ in the civil-military headquarters and later the RSG. When the RSG was scrapped as an operating control for the survival period the concept of the Armed Forces Headquarters or AFHQ was developed although military teams continued to be allocated to the SRCs and their successors. The armed forces would however still be organised on a regional basis and commanded by the Regional Military Commander who would be on the staff of the Regional Commissioner. In the 1970s and 1980s some protected AFHQs were developed for example at the barracks in York and in a small complex of tunnels near Henley on Thames. In addition to the teams at regional headquarters, there would be small military attachments at county controls and each county would be designated as a “tactical area of responsibility”. The first task of the armed forces post-strike would be to continue to defend the United Kingdom. Thereafter, any surviving forces would be available to assist with rescue and survival operations, but generally in exercises, the role of the armed forces was, from the 1970s very limited.

Under the 1980s plans large numbers of troops would be involved in guarding “key points”. These were places considered vital to the continued effectiveness of the fighting services or for survival post-strike. They included places such as military sites, key communications centres and major road bridges. Some exercises envisaged the armed forces guarding food stocks in the survival period but many places, which might merit guarding, would not be due to shortages of personnel. As well as some designated Territorial Army units an attempt was made in 1982 to boost the numbers of soldiers available for home defence duties, particularly guarding key points with the establishment of the Home Service Force. This was made up of lightly armed former members of the armed forces. The intention was that the force would be 5000 strong by 1990 but in 1986 it had only 3133 members. It was disbanded in 1993.

In exercises, local authority emergency centres were often targeted by protest or other disaffected groups both pre- and post-strike but there were no military guards available to help and frequently no police. Suggestions were made that the local authority staffs should organise their own protection. Similar suggestions were made for areas such as food stores and emergency feeding centres. Some locally based plans included forming vigilante groups to protect the locals from disorderly elements both from within and without.

The military radio network called CONRAD continued to be used into the 1980s. CONRAD was controlled by 2 (National Communications) Signal Brigade and its predecessors whose operational units were then and still are largely Territorial Army ones. The Brigade is still tasked with providing communications support to the machinery of government in war based on the National Communications Radio System, a nationwide radio network that appears to have replaced CONRAD. It is also notable that the 1980s saw a large increase in military communications systems for home defence purposes some of which are known to be mobile using satellite links.

The Fire Service

As with many other plans those for the fire service in the 1950s were grandiose but with little basis in reality. In a war, all the local authority brigades would become part of a national fire service augmented by the volunteers of the Auxiliary Fire Service[3] and military reservists and commanded by a Regional Fire Commander. A key element was to be the 40 Mobile Fire Columns manned by RAF reservists supported by some regular fire crews. These would be formed into self-sufficient columns each with 700 personnel and 30 emergency pumps together with other vehicles and specialist equipment. In the precautionary period, the columns would be formed and then dispersed to unused RAF airfields to await the attack. In reality, they could have made little impact on and area devastated by a hydrogen bomb and if they were sent in they would have very quickly used up their allowed “war emergency dose” of radiation from the fall-out. In practice, their equipment was limited and although the columns nominally existed until 1968 the decline in the number of RAF reservists meant that there were insufficient personnel available.

These problems together with the fact that fire fighting was simply not a practical reality in the face of the hydrogen bomb was reflected in a 1969 review which recommended that, in war, the fire service would use only its peacetime manpower, it should not undertake fire fighting and the emphasis should be on the preservation of the service for vital tasks in the survival period such as moving water and decontamination. This lead to a simpler structure being introduced in 1974. The peacetime command structure would now be retained in war but overall control would be in the hands of the Sub Regional Fire Commander at the SRHQ. The concept of the mobile column had been abandoned but use of existing fire service manpower would be maximised and volunteers sought so that use could be made of the former Auxiliary Fire Service equipment which was still held in store by the Home Office. This included 1079 emergency pumps (commonly known as Green Goddesses) together with Land Rovers, inflatable dams (to hold water), hoses, etc. Nominally, Green Goddesses would be issued on the basis of one per 50000 people so that in the 1980s London would receive 153 to supplement its 200 red engines. Up to 50% of the regular fire service men and equipment would be withdrawn from their normal stations in the crisis period and dispersed. After nuclear attack, fires would only be tackled when this would be worthwhile although the main consideration would be to preserve the service for the survival period and beyond. In practice, the main role of the fire service would probably have been to transport drinking water to emergency feeding sites. This basic structure was continued into the 1980s although Fire Service Circular FS6/84 introduced the need to plan for conventional attacks and it was expected that the “small but widespread” attacks would be tackled using the existing brigade resources.

The Police

In a period of crisis or conventional war, the police would be expected to continue their normal operations although their resources would come under much greater pressure. In addition, early plans envisaged a much wider role even before a nuclear attack. The 1965 Essex Civil Defence Corps Group War Plan listed their tasks as –

In 1964 the civil defence organisation was at its most complex when the regional organisation included RSGs, SRHQs and various levels of local control and the Home Office’s Police War Committee suggested a wartime policing structure to fit it. The Regional Commissioner would appoint a Regional Police Commander who, based at the RSG, would direct all strategic aspects of police operations and resources, including the Mobile Columns, under the Commissioner’s authority. The appointment would however cause practical problems as the Regional Commissioners would have no powers until after an attack.

The operational aspects of policing would be handled by the Sub Regional Police Commander and his team of 24 based at the SRHQ. At the local level the Chief Constable would still be responsible for the maintenance of law and order. In 1964 the Treasury approved expenditure for equip new force and divisional police headquarters with protected control rooms but nothing seems to have come of this as in 1967 the War Duties Committee suggested using prefabricated concrete blocks, as used to protect GPO switchboards, to protect police stations.

Whether or not to arm the police appears to have been a difficult decision and one which was repeatedly fudged. In the mid-1960s it was suggested that 34700 rifles and 93000 pistols would be needed. But problems such as the cost of buying pistols from the Ministry of defence, provision of ammunition for training and the need for a cover story for such a sensitive matter delayed matters and by 1967 it was said that the only weapons available would be the rifles used by the Army Cadet Corps.

The police would have had a major role in keeping the Essential Service Routes clear. These were originally designated in the 1950s to keep major routes open for the life saving forces to reach the bombed cities. By 1967 the plan had been overtaken by events and there would be insufficient forces available. It was therefore redrawn with fewer routes mainly to be kept clear for military mobilisation in the Precautionary Period.

The police kept their own War Books and the Home Office would issue “polwins” or “police war instructions”. One such instruction from the mid-1960s covered the detention of suspected persons. The legal authority for this would come from the emergency powers regulations and a master list of political detainees known as the Everest List was kept centrally for the purpose.

Another instruction was aimed at preserving fuel by sealing certain petrol stations. In an emergency the police would visit, without prior notice, certain petrol stations where they would obtain all the keys, lock the pumps and buildings, remove all fuses and put up a “closed” sign.

The late 1950s plans envisaged that all available manpower would be mobilised and a proportion organised into up to 167 self-supporting mobile police columns with 135 men in each. South West Region for example planned to raise 10 such columns. These would be dispersed away from the areas which were expected to be attacked possibly to former airfields. Some Metropolitan Police columns would be based for example in rural Essex ready to move back into the capital after the nuclear attack. However, equipment was always short and in 1967 there was only enough to equip 34 columns. The concept was abandoned and replaced in 1972 with the idea of forming 20% of each force’s strength into smaller, more mobile Police Support Units each of 35 men. Plans existed to maximise police strength and in 1964 it was suggested that Traffic Wardens might be employed in war. This was however apparently not reconsidered again until 1967 when the plan was seen as impractical because emergency powers would probably be ineffective in of directing labour.

In the 1980s, the police’s role in the transition to war phase was emphasised with additional roles in managing traffic, manning the warning system and assisting with the effects of conventional attack. Manpower would be maximised by using Special Constables and Traffic Wardens were again mentioned[5], encouraging volunteers from the public, restricting training and administration and introducing longer shifts. However, no mention was made in the EPGLA of the massive law and order problems, which were anticipated in all exercises, nor was mention made of arming the police, which was actively considered in the 1960s.

[1] At this time, the preservation of law and order was expected to be a major problem so much so that one report proposed that light aircraft could be used “to deliver CS agents to assist the police pre- and post-attack”. A mass arming of the police was also contemplated using surplus army small arms and those held by cadet forces.

[2] ES11/1974

[3] Numbering some 13000 in the mid-1960s.

[4] Essential service routes were major roads designated for use official vehicles and which would be kept clear of refugees, etc.

[5] Powers would have existed under the emergency legislation to direct labour to where ever place and to do whatever job was needed.

File 15 The Uniformed Services
Armed forces - fire service - police
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